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The term “minimal phenomenal selfhood” (MPS) describes the basic, pre-reflective
experience of being a self (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Theoretical accounts of the
minimal self have long recognized the importance and the ambivalence of the body
as both part of the physical world, and the enabling condition for being in this world
(Gallagher, 2005a; Grafton, 2009). A recent account of MPS (Metzinger, 2004a) centers
on the consideration that minimal selfhood emerges as the result of basic self-modeling
mechanisms, thereby being founded on pre-reflective bodily processes. The free energy
principle (FEP; Friston, 2010) is a novel unified theory of cortical function built upon
the imperative that self-organizing systems entail hierarchical generative models of the
causes of their sensory input, which are optimized by minimizing free energy as an
approximation of the log-likelihood of the model. The implementation of the FEP via
predictive coding mechanisms and in particular the active inference principle emphasizes
the role of embodiment for predictive self-modeling, which has been appreciated in recent
publications. In this review, we provide an overview of these conceptions and illustrate
thereby the potential power of the FEP in explaining the mechanisms underlying minimal
selfhood and its key constituents, multisensory integration, interoception, agency,
perspective, and the experience of mineness. We conclude that the conceptualization
of MPS can be well mapped onto a hierarchical generative model furnished by the FEP
and may constitute the basis for higher-level, cognitive forms of self-referral, as well as
the understanding of other minds.
Keywords: free energy principle, predictive coding, active inference, self, minimal phenomenal selfhood, owner-
ship, agency, self-model
INTRODUCTION
What lets an organism be a self? Throughout philosophical
attempts to understand the enabling conditions of minimal
self-awareness (Zahavi, 1999), or minimal phenomenal selfhood
(MPS)1 (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009), the special status of the
body among all other physical things has long been apparent
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Bermúdez et al., 1998; Anderson and
Perlis, 2005; Legrand, 2006; Blanke, 2012). Recently, the role of
the human body for cognition has been re-emphasized in the
field of embodied cognition (Varela et al., 1994; Clark, 1999;
Gallagher, 2005a; Grafton, 2009; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011).
1In general, this approach is concerned with “global aspects of bodily self-
consciousness” (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009), where a global property is
something that can only be ascribed to a system as a whole, and self-
consciousness refers to “the ability to become aware of one’s own mental and
bodily states . . . as one’s own mental and bodily states” (Vogeley and Fink,
2003). The kind of self-consciousness meant here is not cognitive but “imme-
diate, pre-reflective and non-observational” (see also Zahavi, 1999; Gallagher,
2005a; Legrand, 2006; Hohwy, 2007), where the term pre-reflective is referring
to levels of self-awareness that are independent of explicit cognition and
linguistic abilities (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). In its simplest form, this is
theminimal phenomenal self, the “fundamental conscious experience of being
someone” (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009).
The body lets us interact with the world via perception and action
(Legrand, 2006; Friston, 2011; Farmer and Tsakiris, 2012), leading
to a whole new form of intelligence that is different from, for
example, mere computation (Frith, 2007; Grafton, 2009). One’s
everyday experience is enabled and structured through a body
that is “always there” (James, 1890), and hence the body—my
body—is not just part of the physical world, but also the “vehicle”
that enables being a self in this world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962;
Varela et al., 1994; Gallagher, 2005a). Minimal, or pre-reflective
selfhood emerges from this experience of a unified, situated
living body as a “sensorimotor unity anchored to its world”
(Bermúdez et al., 1998; Anderson and Perlis, 2005; Gallagher,
2005a; Legrand, 2006; Hohwy, 2010; Blanke, 2012; Apps and
Tsakiris, 2013).
In this review, we will particularly consider an account of the
mechanisms giving rise to minimal selfhood that has recently
been proposed by Metzinger (2003, 2004a,b, 2005). Central to
the theory is the premise that minimal selfhood emerges as the
result of pre-reflective self-modeling, i.e., through an organism’s
model of the world that is phenomenologically centered onto the
self. Thereby, Metzinger’s account builds on the proposition that
the brain is a representational system that needs to interpret the
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world (Gallese and Metzinger, 2003), and thus constructs and
simulates a model in order to reduce ambiguity originating from
the external world (Metzinger, 2005). For this system-model to
be successful, i.e., of adaptive value, “the self needs to be embed-
ded into the causal network of the physical world” (Knoblich
et al., 2003; Metzinger, 2004a, 2005). The model thus also has
to include as part of itself the physical body—“the part of the
simulation that represents the system itself” (Edelman, 2008, p.
419). Metzinger (2004a) emphasizes that this self-representation
of the system is special in that it (i.e., the body) is the only
representational structure that constantly generates and receives
internal input via its different intero- and proprioceptive systems.
Notably, a resulting structural property of the system-model is
the spatiotemporal centeredness of the model onto a coher-
ent phenomenal subject, described by Metzinger with the term
perspectivalness (Metzinger, 2004a, 2005; Blanke and Metzinger,
2009). Throughout this review, we will return to this, and propose
to understand it as an instance of “perspective taking”, whereby
the brain assigns the subjective, first-person perspective (1PP) to
its self-model.
Following their emphasis of self-modeling mechanisms for
minimal selfhood, Metzinger and colleagues (Knoblich et al.,
2003) have argued that an analysis of selfhood should focus on the
underlying functional properties of the system, i.e., the brain. In
this review, we will examine one promising candidate brain theory
for this analysis: over the last years, a general theoretical account
of cortical function based on the “free energy principle” (FEP) has
been put forth by Friston (Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2009, 2010;
Clark, 2013), based on the conclusive assumption that the brain
entails hierarchical dynamical models to predict the causes of its
sensory data (Hohwy, 2007; Frith, 2007; Friston and Kiebel, 2009;
Bubic et al., 2010).
The key premise of the FEP is that self-organizing organisms
have to resist the natural tendency to disorder that is implied by
the second law of thermodynamics, i.e., they have to “maintain
their states and form in the face of a constantly changing environ-
ment” (Friston, 2010). Organisms do so by avoiding surprise asso-
ciated with their sensory states (Friston et al., 2011, 2012; Friston,
2012a,b), which in turn will result in a (desired) state where the
world is highly predictable. The FEP proposes that the brain infers
the hidden causes of the environment via the inversion of hierar-
chical generative models that predict their sensory consequences
(Friston, 2010; Bastos et al., 2012), with higher levels encoding
increasingly abstract and information-integrating conceptions of
the world (Fotopoulou, 2012; Clark, 2013). Importantly, as bio-
logical organisms are embodied in the environment, the “world-
model” of a self-organizing system also has to include the sensory
apparatus (the body) of the organism (Friston, 2012b; Friston
et al., 2012; Clark, 2013). In agreement with the Good Regula-
tor theorem (Conant and Ashby, 1970; Edelman, 2008; Friston
et al., 2012), which states that every good regulator of a system
will ultimately become a model of that system, the FEP thus
proposes as a consequence of hierarchical predictive modeling
that “I model myself as existing” (Friston, 2011, 2013b). We will
later highlight that this conforms nicely to accounts of minimal
selfhood, whereby the self is perceived as a result of dynamic self-
modeling mechanisms (Metzinger, 2004a; Hohwy, 2007).
Conceptually, the FEP is based on the evaluation of the
improbability of some sensory data under a hierarchical
generative model, where the (model-conditional) improbability
of the data is commonly referred to as surprise (Friston et al.,
2006; Friston, 2010, 2011). The theory builds on free energy
as an information-theoretical quantity on the upper bound of
surprise that can be formally assessed (Friston et al., 2006, 2012;
Friston, 2010, 2011). By minimizing free energy within a model,
biological agents thus always also minimize surprise. In principle,
this can be done in two ways: By changing the predictions of the
model by means of perception, or by changing what is predicted
by selectively sampling those sensations that confirm the model’s
predictions by means of action (a “systematic bias in input
sampling”, Verschure et al., 2003; Friston, 2011).
Minimizing surprise associated with sensory data by the inver-
sion of the hierarchical generative model (and the dynamic opti-
mization of its parameters) has been established as predictive
coding (Srinivasan et al., 1982; Mumford, 1992; Rao and Ballard,
1999; Friston, 2005a; Friston and Stephan, 2007; Kilner et al.,
2007; Friston and Kiebel, 2009). Thereby, the predictive coding
scheme infers the hidden causes of its sensory input by mini-
mizing the difference between the predictions about sensory data
and the actual sensory data at any level of the model’s hierarchy,
which is encoded by the prediction error (Friston and Kiebel,
2009; Bubic et al., 2010; Friston, 2010; Brown and Brüne, 2012;
Friston, 2012a). Thus the feedforward signal is not the sensory
information per se, but the associated prediction error that is
passed up the hierarchy (Hohwy, 2012; Clark, 2013), while the
generative model’s predictions are the feedback signal (Friston,
2010; Bastos et al., 2012; Edwards et al., 2012). The second
form of prediction error minimization via interaction with the
environment is described under the active inference principle
(Friston, 2012a, 2013a). Reminiscent of “affordances”, Gibson’s
(1977) famous description of the fact that the environment is “co-
perceived” depending on the perceiver’s bodily endowment, active
inference thus emphasizes the bi-directional role of embodiment
such that “not only does the agent embody the environment but
the environment embodies the agent” (Friston, 2011). Interest-
ingly, the computational assumptions of predictive coding are
surprisingly well reflected by neuroanatomical organization of the
cortex (Bastos et al., 2012; Friston, 2012a), suggesting that neu-
ronal populations indeed encode probabilities, i.e., uncertainty
(Clark, 2013). In sum, predictive coding and active inference
are neurobiologically plausible, “action-oriented” (Bastos et al.,
2012; Clark, 2013) implementations of free energy minimiza-
tion (Friston, 2011; Bastos et al., 2012; Friston, 2012a; Clark,
2013).
In this review, we summarize recently formulated free energy
accounts of key aspects of minimal selfhood: multisensory inte-
gration, interoception, agency, ownership or “mineness” of expe-
rience, the perspectivity of self-models andmodels of other selves.
Common to these FEP applications is the focus on “self modeling”
(Friston, 2012a). We hence consider these approaches in the light
of the proposal that the minimal self is the result of an ongoing
predictive process within a generative model that is centered
onto the organism (Metzinger, 2004a; Hohwy, 2007; Friston,
2011).
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ASPECTS OF THE MINIMAL SELF IN THE FREE ENERGY
FRAMEWORK
A number of publications have recently put forward the idea that
(minimal) selfhood is based on the neurobiological implemen-
tation of hierarchical generative models in the brain (Hohwy,
2007, 2010; Seth et al., 2011; Fotopoulou, 2012; Friston, 2012a,b;
Apps and Tsakiris, 2013; Clark, 2013). In one sentence, these
accounts propose to “understand the elusive sense of minimal
self in terms of having internal models that successfully predict
or match the sensory consequences of our own movement, our
intentions in action, and our sensory input” (Hohwy, 2007). In
accordance with Friston (2011, 2012b, 2013b), who has already
emphasized the fundamental, bi-directional role of embodiment
in the FEP, these accounts also embrace the body as a central
part of the self-model. The aspects of the minimal self that these
approaches formalize in the FEP all follow as consequences from
this embodied self-modeling (Metzinger, 2004a; Hohwy, 2007;
Friston, 2011): The body predicts and integrates multisensory
information in a way that no other physical object does (Hohwy,
2007, 2010; Apps and Tsakiris, 2013), it is the only source of inter-
nally generated input (Seth et al., 2011; Critchley and Seth, 2012),
it is crucial for interaction with the environment and a sense
of agency (Kilner et al., 2007; Frith, 2007; Friston et al., 2011).
From the phenomenological and spatiotemporal centeredness of
experience onto the body (Friston, 2011) emerges the 1PP, and
ultimately, the “mineness” of experience (Hohwy, 2007; Apps and
Tsakiris, 2013).
MULTISENSORY INTEGRATION
A very important implication of the free energy framework is
that sensory information is processed probabilistically, and thus
it follows that the representation of the self is also probabilis-
tic (Friston, 2011). This conceptualization fits comfortably with
Metzinger’s (2004b) theory, where the content of the self-model
is probabilistic, i.e., it is “simply the best hypothesis about the
current state of the system, given all constraints and information
resources currently available” (see also Hohwy, 2010; Clark, 2013;
Friston, 2013b). However, sensory information is not per se spe-
cific to the self, which implies that there must be additional levels
of information processing in which information is related to the
self (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013).
Previous accounts of bodily self-awareness, inspired by work
on illusions of body ownership and related paradigms, have
emphasized the role of multimodal, hierarchical cortical net-
works in processing self-related information (Hohwy, 2007, 2010;
Tsakiris, 2010; Petkova et al., 2011a; Blanke, 2012). In a recent
paper, Apps and Tsakiris (2013) propose that hierarchical predic-
tion error minimization can explain processes of self-recognition
and self-representation: for the processing of information relating
to the self, free energy minimization happens via the integration
of various streams of surprise from unimodal sensory informa-
tion in hierarchically higher multimodal areas, where informa-
tion from any system can be used to “explain away” surprise
in any other system (Hohwy, 2010; Apps and Tsakiris, 2013;
Clark, 2013). This corresponds to the basic claim of predictive
coding about crossmodal information processing, according to
which hierarchically higher levels form amodal concepts that
generate multimodal predictions and prediction errors (Friston,
2012a). Following this logic, higher-level multisensory areas must
predict input in multiple sensory modalities, which according
to Apps and Tsakiris (2013) implies “a high level representa-
tion (of self) that elaborates descending predictions to multiple
unimodal systems” (see also Clark, 2013; Friston, 2013b). This
self-model can thus be seen as the most accurate, immediately
available explanation of the bottom-up surprise from incoming
multisensory information (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013; thereby the
model need not be “true”, just a sufficient explanation of the
sensory input, Schwabe and Blanke, 2008; Hohwy and Paton,
2010; Hohwy, 2012). The predictive coding account suggests that,
at the hierarchically highest level, such a self-model will encode,
as model evidence, the evidence for the existence of the agent in
the present form (Hohwy, 2010; Friston, 2011).
A particularly intriguing example of how self-representation
is constructed in a probabilistic way is the rubber hand illusion
(RHI; Botvinick and Cohen, 1998): observing a dummy hand
being touched, while receiving synchronous tactile stimulation at
the anatomically congruent location of one’s real, hidden hand
typically leads to an illusory experience of feeling the touch on the
dummy hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004,
2005; Makin et al., 2008). This usually results in a self-attribution,
or “incorporation” (Holmes and Spence, 2004) of the fake hand
as a part of one’s own body (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Hohwy
and Paton, 2010; Tsakiris, 2010; Petkova et al., 2011a). A number
of behavioral measures such as a fear response to the dummy
hand being threatened (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson
et al., 2007), or the mislocalization of one’s real hand towards the
location where the dummy hand is seen (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), suggest that the brain indeed
seems to treat the dummy hand as part of the body as a result
of the multisensory stimulation (see Tsakiris, 2010, or Blanke,
2012, for detailed reviews). Using virtual reality techniques, the
RHI paradigm has been extended to induce an illusory self-
identification with a whole dummy body located at a different
position in space (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007). In
those cases, participants exhibited a bias in judging their own
spatial location towards the location where the dummy body was
positioned in space, just as the mislocalization of the own hand
during the RHI (see Blanke, 2012, for a review). These findings
thus impressively demonstrate that perceived self-location can be
manipulated with appropriate stimulation.
Generally, illusory percepts are well explained as a result of
Bayes-optimal inference, i.e., arising from an interpretation of
ambiguous sensory input under strong prior hypotheses (Friston,
2005b; Brown and Friston, 2012; Apps and Tsakiris, 2013; Clark,
2013). Correspondingly, a combination of bottom-up input
and modulatory top-down factors has been suggested to drive
illusory ownership of body parts as experienced during the
RHI (de Vignemont et al., 2005; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; de
Preester and Tsakiris, 2009; Hohwy and Paton, 2010; Tsakiris,
2010). While congruent multisensory input seems crucial for the
RHI (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Armel and Ramachandran,
2003; Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005; Hohwy and Paton, 2010;
Petkova et al., 2011a), there have been strong arguments for
top-down “body representations” that define which objects
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(namely, only anatomically plausible hand-shaped objects, see
e.g., Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005) can be incorporated during
the RHI (de Vignemont et al., 2005; IJsselsteijn et al., 2006;
Costantini and Haggard, 2007; Tsakiris et al., 2007; de Preester
and Tsakiris, 2009). However, various inconsistent definitions of
body representations may have lead to some confusion and thus
prevented the emergence of a unifying theoretical account (de
Vignemont, 2007; Longo et al., 2008; Apps and Tsakiris, 2013).
As a solution to this problem, several authors have endorsed
a predictive coding approach (Hohwy, 2007, 2010; Apps and
Tsakiris, 2013). Consider that, under normal circumstances,
observed touch on our skin is accompanied by a corresponding,
temporally congruent tactile sensation—in predictive coding
terms, the underlying generative model of our physical self
predicts a somatosensory sensation when touch is about to
occur on the body, because associations between events that
have a high probability of predicting events in another system
lead to the formation of beliefs, or priors on a hierarchically
higher level (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013). Note that it are not per
se the associations between different kinds of sensory input
that are of importance here, but the parallel predictions of the
generative model. Among all physical objects in the world, it
is only our body that will evoke (i.e., predicts) this kind of
multisensory sensation—congruence of multisensory input
has (not surprisingly) been called “self-specifying” (Botvinick,
2004) and has been ascribed a crucial role in self-representation
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Armel and Ramachandran, 2003;
Ehrsson et al., 2005; Hohwy and Paton, 2010). Following this
logic, during the RHI, surprise2 or prediction error is evoked by
the simultaneous occurrence of observed touch on an external
object (the dummy hand) together with a somatosensory
sensation, because such congruence is not predicted by the brain’s
initial generative model.
The predictive coding account suggests that, as stimuli can
usually be caused “in an infinite number of ways” (Brown and
Friston, 2012), there are several competing explanations of the
sensory input between which the brain needs to decide. In the
case of the RHI, these are coded by the probabilities of the actual
hand, or the dummy hand being “me” (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013).
One explanation, or model, of the sensory input is that vision
and touch occur at different locations (the “true” model, Hohwy,
2010). However, during the RHI, spatially distributed observed
and felt touch are “bound together” by causal inference (Hohwy,
2012): this “false” model (that observed and felt touch occur at
the same location, namely, one’s own hand) is selected because
it more successfully explains the incoming prediction error in
favor of a unified self (see also Schwabe and Blanke, 2008; Hohwy,
2010; Hohwy and Paton, 2010). This is a crucial point, because
2Although the illusory experience of feeling the touch on the dummy hand
is certainly surprising, one has to distinguish this cognitive surprise of the
agent from “surprise” on a neurobiological level (“surprisal”, see Clark, 2013),
as defined by prediction error. In fact, here these two notions may be
somewhat opposing: the dummy hand is accepted as a part of one’s body as
a result of successfully explaining away the surprise evoked by the ambiguous
multisensory stimulation (Hohwy, 2010; Hohwy and Paton, 2010). However,
the agent experiences exactly this state—owning a lifeless dummy hand—as
surprising.
predictive coding is a “winner takes all” strategy (Hohwy, 2007,
2010): there is always one model that has the lowest amount of
free energy (the highest model evidence) among all possible mod-
els of the sensory input (Friston et al., 2012; Apps and Tsakiris,
2013; Clark, 2013), and this model is selected as the explanation
for the world. This model does not have to be “true”, just a better
explanation of the sensory input than competing models (Friston
et al., 2012). As minimizing surprise is the same as maximizing
model-evidence (where model-evidence is evidence for the agent’s
existence), the agent, or self, in its present formwill cease to exist if
another model has to be chosen as a better explanation of sensory
input (Hohwy, 2010; Friston, 2011): “I” (i.e., the embodied model
of the world) will only exist “iff (sic) I am a veridical model of my
environment” (Friston, 2011).
Applied to the RHI example, this means that if prediction error
could not be explained away in this way, the system might have
to dismiss its current self-model in favor of a better explanation
of the input—which would result in the representation of a
“disunified self” (Hohwy, 2010). The FEP states that, if prediction
error can be explained away at lower levels, there is no need
to adjust higher-level representations (Friston, 2012a). Apps and
Tsakiris (2013) propose that, as the prediction error is passed
up the hierarchy during the RHI, it can be explained away at
multimodal cortical nodes. Thereby “explaining away” means an
updating of the generative model’s predictions about the physical
features of the self to minimize the overall level of surprise
in the system. This results in a different posterior probabilistic
representation of certain features of the self (Hohwy and Paton,
2010; Apps and Tsakiris, 2013), however, without any necessity to
change the actual generative self-model (Hohwy, 2010). Specifi-
cally, the dummy hand is now probabilistically more likely to be
represented as part of one’s body, which in turn is accompanied
by a decrease in the probability that one’s actual hand will be
represented as “self”. This manifests as a self-attribution of the
dummy hand, and a partial rejection of the real limb (de Preester
and Tsakiris, 2009; Tsakiris, 2010).
Indeed, there is compelling experimental evidence in support
of such a probabilistic integration process underlying the RHI.
For example, the mislocalization of one’s real hand towards the
location of the dummy hand is never absolute, but relative; partic-
ipants usually judge the location of their hand several centimeters
closer to the dummy, but not at the same location (Tsakiris and
Haggard, 2005). Lloyd (2007) showed that the RHI gradually
decreases with increasing distance between the own and the
dummy hand. Furthermore, a drop in skin temperature of the
stimulated real hand was found to accompany the RHI (Moseley
et al., 2008), which has been interpreted as evidence for top-down
regulations of autonomic control and interoceptive prediction
error minimization during the RHI (Moseley et al., 2008; Seth
et al., 2011; Suzuki et al., 2013). Also, after the illusion, the dummy
hand is frequently perceived as more similar to one’s real hand
(Longo et al., 2009). These findings suggest that in fact, explaining
away prediction error from ambiguous multisensory stimulation
may lead to changes in the encoded features of the self (Hohwy
and Paton, 2010).
The idea of a probabilistic self-representation in the brain
benefits from the fact that the free energy account is relatively
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unconstrained and thus not as heavily dependent on conceptual
assumptions as other theories (Hohwy, 2007, 2010; Friston, 2008;
Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Friston et al., 2012). Thus the FEP does
not need to treat information relating to the self as a distinct class
of information (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013), because it is concerned
with information flow and system structure. For example, the
matching of sensory predictions based on corollary discharge with
actual sensory input has been previously proposed as a basis
for self-awareness (see Gallagher, 2000; Brown et al., 2013). In
the free energy account, however, self-awareness is not restricted
to the integration of sensorimotor efference and re-afference.
Rather, any type of sensory information can be integrated within
a multimodal, abstract representation of the self, and explain
away surprise in another system (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013). The
RHI example demonstrates that, as claimed by the FEP (Friston,
2012a), if prediction error can be explained away in the periphery
(e.g., adjusting the encoded location of one’s real hand), there is
no need to adjust higher-level representations (the unified self-
model). The FEP is thus a parsimonious, and hence inherently
flexible, formal description of how multisensory information
integration underpins minimal forms of self-awareness (Hohwy,
2010; Blanke, 2012).
INTEROCEPTION
A special case of information that the self-model receives is input
from interoceptive senses: within the world-model, the (own)
body is special among all physical objects in that it constantly
receives a “background buzz” of somatosensory input, including
input from somato-visceral and mechanoreceptors, and higher-
level feeling states (Metzinger, 2004a, 2005; see Friston, 2011).
Acknowledging the importance of interoception, recent work by
Seth (Critchley and Seth, 2012; Seth et al., 2011; Suzuki et al.,
2013) has promoted interoceptive prediction error minimization
as a mechanism for self-representation. Specifically, Seth et al.
provide a predictive coding account of “presence”, where presence
means the subjective experience of being in the here and now
(see Metzinger, 2004a). Presence is hence a structural property
of conscious experience (Seth, 2009) that is transparent in the
sense that Metzinger (2003) uses the term (Seth et al., 2011).
According to Seth et al. (2011), interoceptive predictions arise
from autonomic control signals and sensory inputs evoked by
motor control signals. The generative model of the causes of inte-
roceptive input gives rise to “interoceptive self-representations”
and “emotional feeling states” (Suzuki et al., 2013). Presence
results as the successful suppression of the associated prediction
error (Seth et al., 2011), more specifically, “self-consciousness is
grounded on the feeling states that emerge from interaction of
interoceptive predictions and prediction errors” (Critchley and
Seth, 2012). The emphasis on subjective feeling states (Critchley
et al., 2004; Seth et al., 2011) as a key component of interoceptive
predictive coding links this account to emotion frameworks like
the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1999; Bechara et al.,
2000).
Half a century ago, Schachter and Singer (1962) showed that
people seek explanations for their bodily sensations after having
become aware of them. Reversing this argument, Pennebaker and
Skelton (1981) showed that the perception of bodily sensations
depended on the hypotheses held by the participants, and was
thus not different from the processing of any other ambiguous
information. More recently, Moseley et al. (2008) found that
the RHI led to a cooling of participants’ real hand (and only
the hand affected by the illusion), and concluded that there is a
causal link between self-awareness and homeostatic regulation,
where bodily self-awareness regulates physiological processing
in a top-down manner. In accordance with these results, the
FEP indicates that interoceptive predictions are “one—among
many—of multimodal predictions that emanate from high-level
hypotheses about our embodied state.” (Friston, 2013b; Suzuki
et al., 2013). Interestingly, as we will see later (see Modeling
Others), these predictions can also be used to model others’
internal states (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012). In sum, although
predictive coding accounts of interoception still need detailed
work, the corresponding emphasis of interoceptive signals by
predictive coding (Seth et al., 2011) and philosophical (Metzinger,
2004a) accounts of the self promises many insightful studies
to come.
ACTION AND AGENCY
Agency as a “sense of initiative” (Edelman, 2008) has been empha-
sized as a key component of MPS (Gallagher, 2000; Metzinger,
2004a; Frith, 2007). Distinguishing between self-initiated actions
and actions of other organisms is crucial for being a self. The
importance of the motor system in the brain’s ontology (inter-
pretation) of the world (Gallese and Metzinger, 2003) has been
promoted by forward models of agency based on corollary dis-
charge (Blakemore et al., 2002; Gallagher, 2005a; Frith, 2012),
which have also been applied to describe disturbances of agency
resulting from a failure of these mechanisms (Gallagher, 2000).
Advancing on these accounts, action and the phenomenology of
agency have both been accounted for in terms of hierarchical
generative models (Hohwy, 2007).
The active inference principle is of central importance in
the FEP (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Hohwy, 2007, 2010; Kilner
et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2013; Friston, 2013a): action changes
the sensory input of an organism so that it better corresponds
to the current generative model, without having to revise the
model parameters (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Hohwy, 2010).
This validation of the current generative system-model is a con-
firmation of the agent’s existence (Friston, 2011). However, for
active inference to be feasible, the agent has to be able to predict
which actions will lead to a better confirmation of its predictions.
Friston (2012b) thus states that “implicit in a model of sampling
is a representation or sense of agency”, since the effects of selective
sampling of sensations as through active inference have to be
known—modeled—as well. Thus, by selectively sampling sensa-
tions so that they confirm themodel’s predictions, action is a form
of “reality testing” (Hohwy, 2007). For instance, consider that the
induction of illusory limb or body ownership via multisensory
stimulation (like in the RHI) only works because this kind of
active inference is suppressed.3 If allowed, participants would
3But, as pointed out by Hohwy (2007, 2010), active inference is still happening
at a more subtle level, as participants focus their attention on the rubber hand
to detect potential mismatches of observed and felt touch.
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probably instantaneously move their hand to test whether the
rubber hand moves as well. The illusion will be immediately
abolished once participants see that the rubber hand does not
move according to their intentions (IJsselsteijn et al., 2006; Slater
et al., 2009; Maselli and Slater, 2013), because now there is a clear
mismatch between predicted and actual sensory outcome, which
cannot be explained away.
It is noteworthy that failures in basic inference mechanisms
are a likely cause of many symptoms connected to a disturbed
sense of agency (Gallagher, 2000; Frith, 2007). As stated by
the FEP, probabilistic inference under uncertainty underlies all
perception, and it thus seems reasonable to explain abnormal
experiences in the same framework (Fletcher and Frith, 2008;
Hohwy, 2013). Predictive coding schemes and Bayesian inference
have been successfully applied to explain symptoms like delusion
formation (Fletcher and Frith, 2008; Hohwy, 2013) or failures
in sensory attenuation occurring in schizophrenia (Brown et al.,
2013), hysteria or functional symptoms (Edwards et al., 2012),
out-of-body experiences (Schwabe and Blanke, 2008), and deper-
sonalization (Seth et al., 2011). In many of these cases, basic
mechanisms of active inference fail (Brown et al., 2013), but it
is not yet clear whether these symptoms can be explained by
failures at low levels alone, or rather by a failure of mechanisms
across the hierarchy (Fletcher and Frith, 2008). For instance, a
noisy prediction error signal has been suggested as the cause for
positive symptoms in schizophrenia (Fletcher and Frith, 2008),
while delusions are seen as the result of false inference “at a
conceptual level” (Brown et al., 2013), which may be characterized
by a “lack of independent sources of evidence for reality testing”
(Hohwy, 2013).
In conclusion, action and agency are of fundamental impor-
tance for the experience of normal minimal selfhood. However,
although a sense of agency (Gallagher, 2000) is sufficient for
MPS, it may not be the most basal constituent (Blanke and
Metzinger, 2009). What matters is that I experience the action as
mine (Gallagher, 2000), which brings us to the most important
aspect of the generative self-model: the experience of “mineness”
(Hohwy, 2007).
MINENESS
The phenomenal experience of “mineness” is a key property
of MPS (Metzinger, 2004a). The idea that the living body is
experienced as mine (“owned”) can be traced back to early
phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty or Husserl (see Gallagher,
1986, 2009). It has been claimed that this “self-ownership” (Gal-
lagher, 2000) is the most fundamental sense of phenomenal
selfhood (Aspell et al., 2009; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Simi-
larly, Hohwy (2007) equates experienced mineness of actions and
perceptions with the experience of a minimal self.
In Hohwy’s (2007) FEP account of the self, mineness is a gen-
eral phenomenon, resulting from successful predictions of actions
and perceptions. It is hereby important to keep in mind that
prediction is more than mere anticipation (Hohwy, 2007; Bubic
et al., 2010), but describes predictive modeling as a fundamental
principle of the brain, and that what is informative in predictive
coding is the prediction error. Following Hohwy’s (2007) logic,
phenomenal selfhood thus arises as a consequence of successfully
having predicted incoming sensory input across the hierarchy of
the self-model. Within predictive coding, prediction error is not
explained away post-hoc, but constantly, and across all levels of
the model (Friston, 2012a). Thus mineness is always implicit in
the flow of information within the hierarchical generative self-
model, and can correspondingly be experienced for actions and
perceptions in the same way (note how once again the FEP is
simple in its assumptions). Crucially, this means that the minimal
self is the result of an ongoing, dynamic process, not a static
representation. In this account, mineness is thus situated in a
spatiotemporal reference frame (see Metzinger, 2004a; Hohwy,
2007), where prediction introduces the temporal component of
“being already familiar” with the predicted input (Hohwy, 2007;
see Kiebel et al., 2008; Bubic et al., 2010).
Perhaps a good example for this construction of temporally
extended phenomenal experience from predictive processes is the
classical concept of a body schema (Head and Holmes, 1911–1912;
Merleau-Ponty, 1962). The body schema describes the dynamic
organization of sensorimotor processes subserving motor and
postural functions in a form of “embodied memory” that ulti-
mately presents the body for action (Gallagher, 2009). These
processes are pre-reflective, operating “below the level of self-
referential intentionality” (Gallagher and Cole, 1995), and thus
the body schema is not a static representation (Gallagher, 2005a).
But note that the body schema defines the range of possible
actions that my body can perform, while being “charged” with
what has happened before (see Gallagher, 2009, for a nice review).
In the hierarchical generative self-model, the body schema might
thus be pictured as encoded by a structure of predictions (e.g., of
self-location and proprioception).
In conclusion, the following picture seems to emerge from the
reviewed literature: the FEP is capable of describing the functional
regularities of the brain’s “ontology” (Gallese and Metzinger,
2003), such as the prediction and integration of intero- and
exteroceptive signals (Hohwy, 2010; Seth et al., 2011; Apps and
Tsakiris, 2013), the importance of action and agency (Gallagher,
2000; Hohwy, 2007; Friston, 2012a), and the mineness of experi-
ence (Hohwy, 2007, 2010). In agreement with the Good Regulator
theorem (Conant and Ashby, 1970; Edelman, 2008; Friston et al.,
2012), which states that every good regulator of a system will
ultimately become a model of that system, both the FEP and the
philosophical account of minimal selfhood agree that the agent
is the current embodied model of the world (Metzinger, 2004a;
Hohwy, 2007; Friston, 2011).
THE PERSPECTIVITY OF THE SELF-MODEL
In accordance with the FEP, the phenomenal self-model (PSM)
theory views selves as processes, not objects. Accordingly, the self
is perceived because systems with a PSM constantly assume, or
model, their own existence as a coherent entity (Metzinger, 2004a;
Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). However, to assume that there is a
perceiver is a fallacy (“no such things as selves exist in the world”,
Metzinger, 2005). Rather, a conscious self is a result of the system’s
identification with its self-model (“you are the content of your
PSM”, Metzinger, 2005).
This self-identification is possible because the “attentional
unavailability of earlier processing stages in the brain for intro-
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 547 | 6
Limanowski and Blankenburg Minimal self-models and the free energy principle
spection” (Metzinger, 2003, 2005) leads to a gradually increas-
ing transparency of higher-level phenomenal states. Transparency
thus describes the fact that only the contents of phenomenal
states, not their underlyingmechanisms, are introspectively acces-
sible to the subject of experience (Metzinger, 2003, 2004a). Inter-
estingly, it has been proposed that the cognitive impenetrability
of predictive coding mechanisms can be explained by the fact
that hierarchically higher levels predict on longer timescales, and
more abstractly than lower levels (Hohwy, 2007, 2010; Kiebel
et al., 2008). Failures in these mechanisms may result in severe
symptoms that seem to be related to a loss of global experiential
selfhood, as demonstrated by certain disorders of “presence” such
as depersonalization disorder (Seth et al., 2011). These phenom-
ena might also be described by a loss of transparency (“if . . .
the self-model of a conscious system would become fully opaque,
then the phenomenal target property of experiential “selfhood”
would disappear”, Metzinger, 2004b).
Thus, the crucial implication of transparency is that the PSM
“cannot be recognized as a model by the system using it” (Met-
zinger, 2004a), which greatly reduces computational load within
the system by efficiently avoiding an infinite regression that would
otherwise arise from the logical structure of self-modeling (Met-
zinger, 2004a, 2005): “I can never conceive of what it is like to
be me, because that would require the number of recursions I
can physically entertain, plus one” (Friston et al., 2012). Similarly,
the FEP states that systems operating with a self-model will have
an advantage because “a unified self-model is what best allows
computation of the system’s current state such that action can
be undertaken” (Hohwy, 2010; see Friston et al., 2012, for a
discussion).
Note how, by the transparent spatiotemporal centeredness of
the model onto the self (Metzinger, 2003, 2004a; see also Hohwy,
2007; Friston, 2011, 2012b), the model takes on a 1PP (Vogeley
and Fink, 2003). However, the centeredness of the model is
phenomenal, and not just (but also) geometrical (a temporal cen-
tering on the subject happens through successful prediction, see
previous section). This is well reflected by Blanke and Metzinger
(2009), who distinguish between the phenomenally distinct weak
1PP, and strong 1PP: The weak 1PP means a purely geometric
centering of the experiential space upon one’s body, and thus cor-
responds most to the “egocentre” (Roelofs, 1959; Merker, 2007)
or “cyclopean eye” (von Helmholtz, 1962), which can be traced
back to Hering’s (1942) projective geometry. Experimental work
on extending the RHI paradigm has shown that the strength of
illusory self-identification with a dummy or virtual body crucially
depends on this kind of 1PP (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova
et al., 2011b; Maselli and Slater, 2013), and that in addition to
proprioceptive information, vestibular information is crucial for
determining self-location in space (Schwabe and Blanke, 2008;
Blanke, 2012).
As an attempt to summarize the reviewed accounts of the
basic constituents of MPS, Figure 1 shows a schematic depiction
of a hierarchical generative model, predicting from the minimal
phenomenal self to increasingly specific, unimodal lower levels on
shorter timescales (Kiebel et al., 2008; Hohwy, 2010; Clark, 2013).
For simplicity, we have only included one intermediate level in the
hierarchy, consisting of the basic aspects of minimal selfhood as
discussed in the reviewed articles (see Figure caption for a detailed
description).
In the generative self-model (Figure 1), the first-person per-
spective (1PP) node should be taken as a purely geometrical
point of convergence of sensory information from a particu-
lar sensory modality (a “weak 1PP”), whereas the phenomenal
centeredness of the model onto the experiencing subject would
correspond to a “strong 1PP” (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Note
that although the weak 1PP and self-location usually coincide,
these two phenomena can be decoupled in neurological patients
with autoscopic phenomena, while MPS still seems to be normal
in these conditions (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Blanke, 2012).
This seems to speak for a probabilistic processing of minimal
selfhood, and also for a relative independence of 1PP and self-
location (which are therefore also modeled as separate nodes on
the intermediate level of the generative model in Figure 1).
In conclusion, the experienced 1PP presents itself as a key
feature of “mineness”, and thus as a basic constituent of, and
a prerequisite for a minimal self (Gallagher, 2000; Vogeley and
Fink, 2003; Metzinger, 2004a; Blanke andMetzinger, 2009). Some
authors speak of a system’s “ability” to take the 1PP, meaning
the ability to integrate and represent experience, i.e., mental
states, in a common egocentric reference frame centered upon
the body (Vogeley and Fink, 2003). The FEP very comfortably
complies with the assumption that a body model “defines a
volume within a spatial frame of reference . . . within which
the origin of the weak 1PP is localized” (Blanke and Metzinger,
2009; Friston, 2011, 2012b). In this light, we now review the
explanatory power of the FEP for mechanisms of modeling other
agents.
MODELING OTHERS
In opposition to the 1PP, the third-person perspective (3PP) is
the perspective of the observer, i.e., the perspective that is taken
when states are ascribed to someone else (Vogeley and Fink,
2003; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Fuchs, 2012). This form of
perspective taking is of essential importance, for how we make
sense of ourselves in a social environment depends on the repre-
sentation of, and distinction between, actions and states of the
self and those of others (Decety and Sommerville, 2003; Frith,
2007; Bernhardt and Singer, 2012; Farmer and Tsakiris, 2012;
Frith and Frith, 2012). Traditionally, at least two distinct mech-
anisms have been postulated to underlie our understanding of
other’s internal states: experience sharing andmentalizing (Brown
and Brüne, 2012; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). While experience
sharing refers to a mere mirroring of others’ action intentions,
sensations, or emotions (Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011), the term
mentalizing describes explicitly reflecting others’ internal states:
in a recent review, Zaki and Ochsner (2012) define themechanism
behind mentalizing as “the ability to represent states outside of a
perceiver’s ‘here and now”’, thus having both a spatial 1PP and a
temporal (present versus past and future) aspect. Crucially, this
involves a representation of other agents as possessing a 1PP that
differs from one’s own (Farmer and Tsakiris, 2012). One can also
describe these processes as simulating other PSMs (Metzinger,
2004a); in this way, a pre-reflective, phenomenally transparent
self-model is necessary for the formation of higher-level cognitive
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic proposal for a mapping of the phenomenal
self-model onto a hierarchical generative model (format adapted from
Bastos et al., 2012). Shown here is only the system’s model of itself,
where representational nodes at each level generate descending predictions
to increasingly specialized lower levels (symbolized by darker arrows). In this
special case, the single modeled cause of sensations is the minimal
phenomenal self (Metzinger, 2004a), which generates predictions about the
state of one or many sensory modalities (blue circles). The inversion of this
generative model (a predictive coding scheme, lighter arrows) infers hidden
causes—and thus ultimately, the self as the single cause—of sensory input
via minimization of prediction error (Friston, 2011). For simplicity, only one
intermediate level of nodes within the hierarchy is displayed, consisting of the
basic properties of minimal selfhood as reviewed (white circles). As a
(simplified) illustration of the hierarchical generative processing, the case of
the 1PP is highlighted. Here, descending predictions of the unified self-model
(black arrows) generate sensory data s(i) in the respective modalities (auditory
and visual). This happens via a hierarchy of hidden states x(i) and hidden
causes v(i) (the 1PP), which generate predictions about data in the level
below. The green gradient symbolizes increasing transparency of the
accompanying phenomenal states with ascending hierarchy, where the final
cause (the self) is completely transparent. Note that at this (highest) level,
there is no further representational node; this acknowledges the fact that the
perception of a unified minimal self is the result of a temporally extended
predictive process, not a static representation (Metzinger, 2004a; Hohwy,
2007). The experience of “mineness” of the self (and of perception and action
in general, Hohwy, 2007) is a result of the model’s successful predictions and
thus implicitly symbolized by the arrows. Input into this system-model comes
from intero- and exteroception (blue circles), while active inference is a
means of changing predicted input in all modalities through interaction with
the environment. As the model-evidence is evidence for the agent’s existence
(Friston, 2011, 2013b), the model will necessarily be a veridical model of the
agent: if there was too much unexplained prediction error, the model would
be abandoned in favor of a model with a higher evidence; the self in the
present form would cease to exist (Hohwy, 2010; Friston, 2011, 2012b).
and social mental concepts (Metzinger, 2003, 2004a, 2005; Edel-
man, 2008; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009).
Humans display first instances of experience sharing almost
from birth onwards (Tomasello et al., 2005), for example, human
infants as young as one hour after birth can already imitate
facial gestures (Meltzoff and Moore, 1983). It hence seems that
an “experiential connection” between self and others is already
present in newborn infants (Gallagher and Meltzoff, 1996; Fuchs,
2012). Another example for such a pre-reflective self-other con-
nection is sensorimotor mirroring (“neural resonance”, Zaki and
Ochsner, 2012). Many studies have reported vicarious activations
of the motor system by observing others’ actions (Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004), or likewise of the somatosensory system by
the observation of touch (Keysers et al., 2010) or pain to others
(Bernhardt and Singer, 2012). These findings suggest a very basic,
automatic activation of one’s representations to another person’s
action intentions, or experience (Keysers et al., 2010; Zaki and
Ochsner, 2012). There have been arguments for a link between
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sensory mirroring mechanisms and higher-level perspective tak-
ing abilities (see Preston and de Waal, 2002, for a discussion),
suggesting that although such vicarious responses are activated
automatically, they are not purely sensory-driven (Singer and
Lamm, 2009).
The FEP emphasizes models of the behavior and intentions of
others as a crucial determinant of our own behavior (Frith, 2007;
Friston, 2012a). It has accordingly been proposed that mecha-
nisms of social cognition are based on predictive coding as well
(Baker et al., 2011; Brown and Brüne, 2012; Frith and Frith, 2012),
where perspective taking can be described as forming “second
order representations” (Friston, 2013b). In other words, as agents,
we also have to predict the behavior of other agents, by not only
generating a model of the physical world (and our body) but also
of the mental world-models of our conspecifics based on their
behavior (Frith, 2007; Frith and Frith, 2012). Crucially, we have to
continually update our models of others’ mental states via predic-
tion errors, because these states are not stable but vary over time
(Frith and Frith, 2012). This task is far from trivial, and involves
many levels of differential self-other modeling ranging from a
purely spatial differentiation (other agents occupy different posi-
tions in the world) to the abstract modeling of other minds like in
Theory of Mind (Vogeley and Fink, 2003; Baker et al., 2011).
Several recent accounts have proposed that associative learning
updated through prediction errors is a common computational
mechanism underlying both reward learning and social learning
(Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008; Frith and Frith,
2012). Experimental evidence from these studies suggests that
prediction errors code for false predictions about others’ mental
states (Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008), and even for
discrepancies between predictions of others and actual outcome
of their choice (Apps et al., 2013). Interestingly, it seems that
even low-level predictions can also be updated interactively. For
example, dyads of individuals with similar perceptual sensitivity
may benefit from interactive decision-making, as shown by an
increased performance in a collective perceptual decision task
during which levels of confidence were communicated (Bahrami
et al., 2010). As mentioned before, if these basic predictive mech-
anisms fail, pathological behavior can emerge (Fletcher and Frith,
2008; Brown et al., 2013). For example, perspective taking abil-
ities seem to be often impaired in individuals suffering from
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; Oberman and Ramachandran,
2007; but cf. Hamilton et al., 2007), while there is also evidence
for impaired predictive coding mechanisms in ASD (Friston,
2012a).
An intriguing question is whether the brain uses the same
models to generate predictions about own and other behavior. In
a predictive coding account of action understanding, Kilner and
colleagues (Kilner et al., 2007; Friston et al., 2011) have argued
that themirror neuron system is part of a generative model predict-
ing the sensory consequences of actions, and that indeed, it seems
that the brain applies the same model to predict one’s own, and
others’ actions. Actions are thereby modeled on four hierarchical
levels (Hamilton and Grafton, 2008): intentions, goals, kinemat-
ics, and muscles. By inversion of the model, the brain can thus
infer the causes of own and others’ actions, via explaining away
prediction error across these four levels. Thus the mirror neu-
ron system is active during action observation because the “own”
generative model is inverted to infer the intention underlying the
observed action. A similar argument is made by Gallese and Sini-
gaglia (2011) (see also Goldman and de Vignemont, 2009) to
explain embodied simulation in general by the fact that represen-
tations of states of the self and others’ states have the same bodily
format, and thus the same constraints. Correspondingly, there is
evidence that the same neuronal structures may be involved in
predicting own and others’ internal states (Bernhardt and Singer,
2012), for example, in predicting how pain will feel for others
(Singer et al., 2004). In sum, there is strong evidence that others’
mental states are inferred via internal models. It seems that the
use of generative models by the brain can explain many of these
basic, as well as more elaborated social mechanisms. Thereby
(at least partially) common predictive mechanisms for self and
others strongly support the notion of perspective taking as an
“embodied cognitive process” (Kessler and Thomson, 2010). This
is a relatively young, but promising field of research; it is up to
future studies to evaluate the explanatory power of the FEP in this
domain.
CONCLUSION
In this review, we have summarized proposals from different
authors, all emphasizing the concept of hierarchical generative
models to explain processes underlying the bodily foundations
of MPS, including its fundamental constituents such as multisen-
sory integration, the sense of agency, the experience of mineness,
perspectivity, and its phenomenal transparency. We have reviewed
these free energy accounts of key aspects of minimal selfhood in
the light of the premise that the self is the result of a generative
process of self-modeling (Metzinger, 2004a; Hohwy, 2007). The
approaches reviewed here show that the FEP complies with the
claim that minimal selfhood emerges from physiological processes
(Gallagher, 1986, 2000; Zahavi, 1999; Legrand, 2006; Blanke and
Metzinger, 2009), and acknowledges both the phenomenal and
spatiotemporal centeredness of the generative self-model as a key
for minimal self-awareness. Albeit still schematic, these accounts
demonstrate that the predictive coding account can inform the-
oretical and experimental approaches towards the normal and
pathological self. The FEP is increasingly gaining influence as
a “deeply unified account of perception, cognition, and action”
(Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2010; Apps and Tsakiris, 2013; Clark,
2013), up to recent accounts proposing it as a general mechanism
underlying evolution and the “emergence of life” itself (Friston,
2013c). A particular strength of the approach seems to be that it
makes relatively few conceptual assumptions (Hohwy, 2007, 2010;
Friston, 2008; Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Friston et al., 2012), thus
being capable of formalizing both spatial and social aspects of self-
models. Of course, there are many outstanding issues, and the
free energy formulation will have to withstand thorough empiri-
cal testing (for discussions, Friston et al., 2012; Apps and Tsakiris,
2013; see Clark, 2013). While it is well-established in the domains
of action and perception, future work will have to show whether
the FEP can be similarly influential in cognitive and social
domains. Particularly, the social domain lacks models (Frith and
Frith, 2012), and currently the FEP seems one of the most promis-
ing candidate theories to formally describing the mechanisms
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 547 | 9
Limanowski and Blankenburg Minimal self-models and the free energy principle
underlying the experience of being a “self in relation to others”
(Frith, 2007; Friston, 2012a). The FEP may thus provide a frame-
work to address philosophical debates about self-modeling (Gal-
lagher, 2005b; cf. Metzinger, 2006), and perhaps help to bridge
gaps between neuroscientific and philosophical approaches to
the self.
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